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Gross: "Spirit" Of The Three Strikes Law

COMMENT
THE "SPIRIT' OF THE THREE
STRIKES LAW: FROM THE
ROMERO MYTH TO THE HOPEFUL
IMPLICATIONS OF ANDRADE
INTRODUCTION

We watch enthralled as television news programs
sensationalize some of the saddest moments of our reality. We
are shocked by the violence and brutality of those who prey on
the innocent and vulnerable. We become both enraged and
frightened as we realize that there are people among us who
have no regard for human life. In the wake of tragedy, we
furiously search for answers, we seek ways to avoid suffering
the same pain in the future and, often, we sacrifice the rights of
many, believing that such a sacrifice is necessary and justified.
A prime example of this reaction is California's anti-recidivist
legislation known colloquially as "three strikes and you're out."
This comment tracks an occurrence of this vicious cycle in
California. Part I explains how the fear of crime as well as
frustration with repeat offenders and the revolving door of the
criminal justice system rose to an all-time high and contributed
to the development of California's Three Strikes Law. 1 This
section also explores how the California Supreme Court has
interpreted and attempted to refine the Three Strikes' Law and
specifically how the Court addressed the issue of judicial
discretion in sentencing under the Three Strikes Law. 2
Additionally, this section addresses the United States Supreme

1
2

See infra notes ~O and accompanying text.
See infra notes 41-79 and accompanying text.
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Court's analysis of what type of sentence violates a defendant's
constitutional rights. 3
Part II describes how California's lower courts have
refused to employ judicial discretion. 4 Part III shows why the
application of the law, even with court-attempted refinement,
is constitutionally flawed and may also be ineffective as a
measure to prevent violent crime. 5
Part IV explores the latest rulings from the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeal regarding the constitutionality of California's
Three Strikes Law. 6 This Part also suggests a solution to
balance the citizens' desire for a workable recidivist statute
with the need to keep criminal punishment in California both
fair and constitutional. 7

1. EXTREME CASES SPUR ENACTMENT OF THE THREE STRIKES
LAw
On October 1, 1993 Richard Davis abducted twelve-yearold Polly Klaas from her home at knifepoint.8 He strangled her
and left her body at an abandoned lumber mill. 9 Davis was a
repeat offender. 10 In 1975, he served a year in prison for
burglary.11 Seven weeks after his release, the police arrested
him for sexually assaulting a woman at a Hayward, California
train station. 12 He remained in prison for that crime until
1982.13 Three years after his release he returned to prison for
abducting a woman and forcing her to withdraw money from
her bank account.14 Davis was paroled three months before
Polly Klaas's abduction. 15 An intense campaign that focused on

See infra notes 80-105 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 111-153 and accompanying text.
5
See infra notes 154-185 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 186-248 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 249-269 and accompanying text.
8 Ken Hoover, Polly'S Killer Guilty on All Counts / Death Penalty Possible for
Murder, Kidnapping, S.F. CHRON., June 19, 1996, at AI.
9 Ron Sonenshine, Polly's Dad Forms Foundation: Marc Klaas' Group to Focus on
Crimes Against Children, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 23, 1994, at B4.
10 Hoover, supra note 8, at AI.
11 [d.
12 [d.
13 [d.
14 [d.
15 Hoover, supra note 8, at AI.
3
4
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preventing tragedies such as the Polly Klaas murder fueled
California's Three Strikes Initiative in 1994. 16
Similarly, a recidivist murdered Kimber Reynolds. Kimber
was shot when she tried to prevent a thief from stealing her
purse. 17 Both of these tragedies seemed to highlight significant
problems with California's criminal justice system.
Recidivism,18 and a greater societal belief that those who
commit crimes are incapable of rehabilitation, led segments of
the community to call for tougher sentencing for violent crimes.
Families of both Polly and Kimber spearheaded the Three
Strikes campaign; a number of politicians joined the cause
fearing the political demise of being labeled as soft on crime. 19
Several months before Three Strikes appeared as an
initiative on the California ballot, politicians attempted to
answer the community's call for change. The legislature
enacted a habitual criminals sentencing enhancement under
Section 667 of the California Penal Code. 20
Section 667
provides a sentencing enhancement, which lengthens the
prison term, for anyone convicted of any felony with a prior
violent 21 or serious felony conviction. 22 The punishment for a
16 Greg Lucas, Voters Get Their Chance at Bat On '3 Strikes You're Out' Law, S.F.
CHRON., Oct. 15, 1994, at A2.
17 [d.
18 Recidivism is defined as follows: "[a] tendency to relapse into a habit of criminal
activity or behavior." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1276 (7th ed. 1999).
19 Harriet Chiang, Davis' Legacy: California Three Strikes Law/ Outcry Led to Long
Sentences for Thousands of Convicts, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 6, 1996, at All. See also Erik
G. Luna, Foreword: Three Strikes in a Nutshell, 20 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. I, 4-6 (1998).
(Explaining "state politicians were afraid to question the 'anti-crime fervor', which
gripped the public following the Klaas murder [and] state legislators were
apprehensive to openly discuss the merits of Three Strikes, and those that did and
dared to oppose the measure were publicly derided and vilified." [d.)
20 See generally CAL. PEN. CODE § 667(a)(1) (West, 2001), which provides in
relevant part, "any person convicted of a serious felony who previously has been
convicted of a serious felony in this state or any offense committed in another
jurisdiction which includes all the elements of any serious felony, shall receive, in
addition to the sentence imposed by the court for the present offense, a five-year
enhancement for each such prior conviction on charges brought and tried separately.
The terms of the present offense and each enhancement shall run consecutively."; CAL.
PEN. CODE § 667 (c)(2)(A): "[i]f a defendant has two or more prior ["violent or serious'l
felony convictions ... that have been pled and proved, the term of life imprisonment
with a minimum term of the indeterminate sentence calculated as the greater of: (i)
Three times the term otherwise provided as punishment for each current felony
conviction subsequent to the two or more prior felony convictions. (ii) Imprisonment in
the state prison for 25 years..."
21 CAL. PEN. CODE § 667.5 (West 2001): "For the purpose of this section, "violent
felony" shall mean any of the following:
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(1) Murder or voluntary manslaughter.
(2) Mayhem.

(3) Rape as defined in paragraph (2) or (6) of subdivision (a) of Section 261 or
paragraph (1) or
(4) of subdivision (a) of Section 262.
(4) Sodomy by force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful
bodily injury on the victim or another person.
(5) Oral copulation by force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and
unlawful bodily injury on the victim or another person.
(6) Lewd acts on a child under the age of 14 years as defined in Section 288.
(7) Any felony punishable by death or imprisonment in the state prison for life.
(8) Any felony in which the defendant inflicts great bodily injury on any person
other than an accomplice which has been charged and proved as provided for in
Section 12022.7 or 12022.9 on or after July 1, 1977, or as specified prior to July 1,
1977, in Sections 213, 264, and 461, or any felony in which the defendant uses a
firearm which use has been charged and proved as provided in Section 12022.5,
or 12022.55.
(9) Any robbery.
(10) Arson, in violation of subdivision (a) or (b) of Section 45l.
(11) The offense defined in subdivision (a) of Section 289 where the act is
accomplished against the victim's will by force, violence, duress, menace, or fear
of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the victim or another person.
(12) Attempted murder.
(13) A violation of Section 12308, 12309, or 12310.
(14) Kidnapping.
(15) Assault with the intent to commit mayhem, rape, sodomy, or oral copulation,
in violation of Section 220.
(16) Continuous sexual abuse of a child, in violation of Section 288.5.
(17) Carjacking, as defined in subdivision (a) of Section 215 .
(18) A violation of Section 264.1.
(19) Extortion, as defined in Section 518, which would constitute a felony
violation of Section 186.22 of the Penal Code.
(20) Threats to victims or witnesses, as defined in Section 136.1, which would
constitute a felony violation of Section 186.22 of the Penal Code.
(21) Any burglary of the first degree, as defined in subdivision (a) of Section 460,
wherein it is charged and proved that another person, other than an accomplice,
was present in the residence during the commission of the burglary.
(22) Any violation of Section 12022.53.
The Legislature finds and declares that these specified crimes merit special
consideration when imposing a sentence to display society'S condemnation for
these extraordinary crimes of violence against the person.

Id.
22 CAL. PEN. CODE § 667 (a) (4) (West 2001) provides: "As used in this subdivision,
'serious felony' means a serious felony listed in subdivision (c) of Section 1192.7." CAL.
PEN. CODE § 1192.7 (West 2001) provides:
As used in this section, 'serious felony' means any of the following: (1) Murder or
voluntary manslaughter; (2) mayhem; (3) rape; (4) sodomy by force, violence,
duress, menace, threat of great bodily injury, or fear of immediate and unlawful
bodily injury on the victim or another person; (5) oral copulation by force,
violence, duress, menace, threat of great bodily injury, or fear of immediate and
unlawful bodily injury on the victim or another person; (6) lewd or lascivious act
on a child under the age of 14 years; (7) any felony punishable by death or
imprisonment in the state prison for life; (8) any felony in which the defendant
personally inflicts great bodily injury on any person, other than an accomplice, or
any felony in which the defendant personally uses a firearm; (9) attempted
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defendant convicted of a felony is a five-year enhancement for
each prior serious felony conviction. 23 Additionally, the normal
prison term for the crime is doubled if the defendant has any
prior "violent or serious" felony convictions. 24 A person, with
two prior convictions for violent or serious felonies, convicted of
any subsequent felony is charged with a third strike and the
punishment is an indeterminate life sentence. 25 Under this
scheme, the third felony need not be violent or serious. Indeed,
a court may be required to elevate a charge that is normally a
misdemeanor, such as petty theft when the defendant has a
murder; (10) assault with intent to commit rape or robbery; (11) assault with a
deadly weapon or instrument on a peace officer; (12) assault by a life prisoner on
a noninmate; (13) assault with a deadly weapon by an inmate; (14) arson; (15)
exploding a destructive device or any explosive with intent to injure; (16)
exploding a destructive device or any explosive causing bodily injury, great bodily
injury, or mayhem; (17) exploding a destructive device or any explosive with
intent to murder; (18) any burglary of the first degree; (19) robbery or bank
robbery; (20) kidnapping; (21) holding of a hostage by a person confined in a state
prison; (22) attempt to commit a felony punishable by death or imprisonment in
the state prison for life; (23) any felony in which the defendant personally used a
dangerous or deadly weapon; (24) selling, furnishing, administering, giving, or
offering to sell, furnish, administer, or give to a minor any heroin, cocaine,
phencyclidine (PCP), or any methamphetamine-related drug, as described in
paragraph (2) of subdivision (d) of Section 11055 of the Health and Safety Code,
or any of the precursors of methamphetamines, as described in subparagraph (A)
of paragraph (1) of subdivision (f) of Section 11055 or subdivision (a) of Section
11100 of the Health and Safety Code; (25) any violation of subdivision (a) of
Section 289 where the act is accomplished against the victim's will by force,
violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the
victim or another person; (26) grand theft involving a firearm; (27) carjacking;
(28) any felony offense, which would also constitute a felony violation of Section
186.22; (29) assault with the intent to commit mayhem, rape, sodomy, or oral
copulation, in violation of Section 220; (30) throwing acid or flammable
substances, in violation of Section 244; (31) assault with a deadly weapon,
firearm, machine gun, assault weapon, or semiautomatic firearm or assault on a
peace officer or firefighter, in violation of Section 245; (32) assault with a deadly
weapon against a public transit employee, custodial officer, or school employee,
in violation of Sections 245.2, 245.3, or 245.5; (33) discharge of a firearm at an
inhabited dwelling, vehicle, or aircraft, in violation of Section 246; (34)
commission of rape or penetration by a foreign object in concert with another
person, in violation of Section 264.1; (35) continuous sexual abuse of a child, in
violation of Section 288.5; (36) shooting from a vehicle, in violation of subdivision
(c) or (d) of Section 12034; (37) intimidation of victims or witnesses, in violation
of Section 136.1; (38) terrorist threats, in violation Section 422; (39) any attempt
to commit a crime listed in this subdivision other than an assault; (40) any
violation of Section 12022.53; and (41) any conspiracy to commit an offense
described in this subdivision.
[d.
23

24
25

CAL. PEN. CODE § 667(a)(1) (West 2001).
CAL. PEN. CODE § 667(e)(1) (West 2001).
CAL. PEN. CODE § 667 (e)(2)(A)(i)-(iii) (West 2001).
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prior petty theft conviction, to a felony and sentence the
defendant to serve twenty-five years to life. 26
The Three Strikes Initiative, eventually codified as
California Penal Code Section 1170.12, requires that anyone
convicted of any felony that has previously been convicted of a
"violent or serious felony" must be sentenced to twice the
number of years generally proscribed for the current felony.27
Anyone convicted of any third felony must be given an
indeterminate sentence of twenty-five years to life. 28 The
ballot initiative required the first two strikes be given for
violent or serious felonies, but permitted the third strike upon
conviction of any felony, which would send a three time
offender to prison for a term of twenty-five years to life
regardless of whether the final offense was neither serious nor
violent. 29 This initiative basically mirrored the ·provision
already enacted by the legislature. 3o While the enactment of a
26 See 1 WITKIN CRIM. LAw, INTRODUCTION TO CRIMES § 72 (e) (3) (3rd ed. 2000)
(describing how certain crimes such as petty theft with a prior are "wobblers" and are
technically felonies, but may be reduced to misdemeanors).
27 CAL. PEN. CODE § 1170.12 (West 2001).
28 CAL. PEN. CODE § 1170.12(c)(2)(A) (West 2001) providing in relevant part, "[i]f a
defendant has two or more prior [violent or serious] felony convictions ... the term for
the current felony conviction shall be an indeterminate term oflife imprisonment ..."
29 See CAL. PEN. CODE § 1170.12(a) (West 2001), which provides: "Notwithstanding
any other provision of law, if a defendant has been convicted of a felony and it has been
pled and proved that the defendant has one or more prior felony convictions, as defined
in subdivision (b), the court shall adhere to each of the following .... " Section 1170.12
(b) in relevant part provides, "Notwithstanding any other provision of law and for the
purposes of this section, a prior conviction of a felony shall be defined as: (1) Any
offense dermed in subdivision (c) of section 667.5 as a violent felony or any offense
defined in subdivision (c) of section 1192.7 as a serious felony in this state ...." Section
1170.12 (c) in relevant part provides:
For purposes of this section, and in addition to any other enhancements or
punishment provisions which may apply, the following shall apply where a
defendant has a prior felony conviction: (1) If a defendant has one prior felony
conviction that has been pled and proved, the determinate term or minimum
term for an indeterminate term shall be twice the term otherwise provided as
punishment for the current felony conviction. (2)(A) If a defendant has two or
more felony convictions, as defined in paragraph (1) of subdivision (b) that have
been pled and proved, the term for the current felony conviction shall be an
indeterminate sentence calculated as the greater of (i) three times the term
otherwise provided as punishment for each current felony conviction subsequent
to the two or more prior felony convictions, or (ii) twenty· five years or (iii) the
term determined by the Court pursuant to section 1170 for the underlying
conviction, including any enhancement applicable under Chapter 4.5
(commencing with Section 1170 of Title 7 of Part 2, or any period prescribed by
Section 190 or 3406 ....
[d.
30 Erik G. Luna, Foreword: Three Strikes in a Nutshell, 20 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 1,
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nearly identical initiative may seem superfluous, some believed
that placing the initiative on the ballot would send a clear and
strong message to the legislature that the community was
serious about creating a tougher criminal justice system. 31
Additionally, the legislature may only change initiatives by a
two-thirds majority vote and thus, proponents of Three Strikes
used the initiative to safeguard the Three Strikes Law from the
possibility of future legislative changes. 32
Before the 1994 election in which Three Strikes was placed
on the ballot, members of Polly's family including her
grandfather Joe Klaas, explained that he and many of the Polly
Klaas Foundation volunteers had collected signatures for the
bill without having read it. 33 Joe Klaas spoke at Golden Gate
University as a representative of the Polly Klaas foundation to
inform people that the law as written, unfairly punishes
residential burglary as harshly as assault, rape or severely
violent crimes, as each of these offenses result in life sentences
after three convictions. 34
In fact, Polly's father, Marc Klaas, removed his name from
support of the 1994 ballot initiative because he believed that
only convictions of violent or serious felonies should count as
strikes. 35 The Klaas family immediately pulled its support
from the campaign and began an anti-initiative campaign in
the hopes of educating Californians regarding the actual
consequences of the initiative. 36 Instead, they lent their
support to a revised version of the recidivist statute named the
Polly Klaas Memorial Bill.37 Unfortunately, the Three Strikes
initiative had already garnered strong support from the
public. 38
The California Correctional Peace Officers
Association, a strong prison guard union, contributed $100,000
to place the initiative on the 1994 ballot. 39 As a result, the
9 (1998).
31 Id.
32 Id. at 9·10.
33 Stephen Schwartz, Joe Klaas Regrets Backing '3 Strikes' Measure, S.F. CHRON.,
Apr. 20, 1994, at A17.
34 Id.
35 Robert B. Gunnison, State Tops Nation in Imprisonment Rate: Three Strikes
Opponents Cite Steep Costs, S.F. CHRON., July 15, 1994, at A20.
36 Sonenshine, supra note 9, at B4.
37 Schwartz, supra note 33, at A17.
38 Chiang, supra note 19, at AI.
39 Lucas, supra note16, at A2.
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Three Strikes Initiative easily passed in the 1994 election with
seventy-two percent approval from California voters.40
After the Three Strikes Law was enacted, California courts
began to confront many issues that were not explicitly
addressed in the statute. One of those issues was whether
judicial discretion in sentencing would survive the required
sentencing enhancement and guidelines of the Three Strikes
Law. 41
A. JUDICIAL DISCRETION AS DEFINED BY ROMERO AND
WILLIAMS

1. The Romero Decision
In 1996, the California Supreme Court confronted the
Three Strikes controversy, deciding whether a trial court may
strike a prior felony conviction under certain circumstances to
avoid overly harsh sentences. Jesus Romero was charged with
possession of .13 grams of cocaine base in 1994.42 Romero was
previously convicted of first and second-degree burglary,
attempted burglary and possession of a controlled substance
between the years of 1980 and 1993. 43 At trial, the court
permitted Romero to enter a guilty plea in exchange for
striking his prior felony convictions. 44
Thus, the court
sentenced him to six years in prison rather than twenty-five
years to life. 45
The court calculated Romero's six-year sentence by
imposing the greatest term permitted for possession and by
adding "three consecutive one-year enhancements for [the]
prior felony convictions."46 The district attorney petitioned for
a writ of mandate and the Court of Appeal concluded that the
trial court had no power in a Three Strikes case to vacate a

40 Bill Jones, Why the Three Strikes Law is Working in California, 11 STAN. L. &
POL'y REV. 23, 24 (Winter 1999).
41 See CAL. PEN. CODE § 1170.2(d)(2) (West 2001), referring to the prosecutor's
power to "dismiss or strike a prior felony conviction allegation in the furtherance of
justice," but making no mention of the same power in the judiciary.
42 People v. Romero, 13 Cal 4th 497, 506 (1996).
43
44

4&

46

Id.
Id at 507.
Id.
Id.
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defendant's prior strikes on its own motion. 47 Romero appealed
his case to the California Supreme Court.48
California Supreme Court Justice Werdegar's majority
opinion held that nothing in the Three Strikes Law prohibits a
trial judge from employing the judicial discretion granted to
them under California Penal Code Section 1385(a).49 Section
1385(a) permits a judge to "either of his or her own motion or
upon the application of the prosecuting attorney, and in
furtherance of justice, order an action to be dismissed."50 The
legislative version of the Three Strikes Law, California Penal
Code Section 667, specifically refers to dismissal under Section
1385(a) and does not explicitly overrule the judicial discretion
created therein. 51
The Romero Court thus found that it would be
unconstitutional to permit the prosecutor to dismiss strikes,
but prohibit the court from doing so, unless the legislature had
explicitly stripped the court of its discretionary power. 52
Although Section 1385(a) on its face does not grant the court
discretionary power in enhancement cases under Section 667,
the Three Strikes Law refers to such discretion and thus, the
court reasoned, the legislative intent was not to eliminate it.53
In doing so, the Court held that "although the legislature may
withdraw the statutory power to dismiss in furtherance of
justice, we conclude it has not done so in the Three Strikes
Law."54
Mter the Romero decision was handed down, California's
legal and political communities voiced both relief and concern.
While district attorneys feared that the Three Strikes Law
would no longer be applied with as much fervor, public
1d.
1d.
49 1d. at 529·30.
50 CAL. PEN. CODE § 1385(a) (West 2001).
61 See CAL. PEN. CODE § 667(1)(2) (West 2001), which provides:
[t]he prosecuting attorney may move to dismiss or strike a prior felony conviction
allegation in the furtherance of justice pursuant to Section 1385, or if there is
insufficient evidence to prove the prior felony conviction. If upon the satisfaction
of the court there is insufficient evidence to prove the prior felony conviction, the
court mat dismiss or strike the allegation.
1d.
62 Romero, 13 Cal 4th at 512, 529·30.
63 1d. at 519·20.
64
1d. at 504.
47

48
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defenders and others concerned about the draconian effects of
the law celebrated the decision as a step in the right
direction. 55

2. The Williams Decision
Although Romero authorized a certain degree of power to
judges to avoid unnecessarily harsh sentences, this power was
severely limited by the California Supreme Court two years
later. 56 Eugene Williams was convicted of driving under the
influence of phencyclidine (PCP) in 1995. 57 This crime is
known as a "wobbler," which means that it may be charged as a
misdemeanor or a felony depending on whether the defendant
has prior convictions of the same offense. 58 The prosecutor
chose to charge Williams with a felony and additionally alleged
that Williams had previously been convicted of three "violent or
serious" felonies, including rape and two convictions for being a
felon in possession of a firearm. 59
Williams requested that the superior court either declare
his current offense a misdemeanor or strike one of his previous
"violent or serious" felonies pursuant to California Penal Code
Section 1385(a).60 The trial court ruled that it would not
categorize his current offense as a misdemeanor, but would
consider striking a prior felony conviction so as to treat
Williams as a two strike case, rather than a three strike case. 61
The court explained that this action was proper because
Williams' prior serious and violent felonies occurred thirteen
years ago, when he was twenty years old, and because Williams
had not committed any crimes involving violence since then. 62
Thereafter, Williams changed his plea to guilty, the superior
court vacated the prior strike for attempted robbery, and
sentenced him to nine years in prison. 63

55
56

57
58

59
60
61

62
63

Chiang, supra note 19, at AI.
People v. Williams, 17 Cal. 4th 148 (1998).
Id. at 152.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 155.
Williams, 17 Cal 4th at 155·56.
Id. at 156.
Id. at 156·57.
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On appeal, the superior court's decision to vacate one of
Williams's strikes was reviewed for abuse of discretion.64 The
Court of Appeal held that the superior court had indeed abused
its discretion, "in light of Williams's 'extraordinary record of
prior criminality."'65 The Court of Appeal further ordered the
superior court to sentence Williams under Three Strikes to a
term of twenty-eight years-to-life.66
Williams petitioned the California Supreme Court and was
granted review. 67 The California Supreme Court attempted to
delineate the boundaries of Romero by explicating how and
when a court should employ judicial discretion to vacate a prior
strike. 68 First, the Court attempted to define the broad
concepts expressed in Section 1385(a).69 It explained that there
is no statutory definition of the phrase "in the furtherance of
justice" and thus its interpretation must be guided by
precedent case law. 70 Accordingly, a court must balance "the
constitutional rights of the defendant, and the interests of
society represented by the People, in determining whether there
should be dismissal."71
The Court decided that the definition of "justice" must be
found within the scheme of the Three Strikes Law.72
Therefore, a court's determination to vacate a prior strike:
must consider whether, in light of the nature and
circumstances of his present felonies and prior serious and/or
violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his
background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be
deemed outside the scheme's spirit, in whole or in part, and
hence should be treated as though he had not previously been
convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felonies. 73

64
65

[d. at 157.
[d.

66

Williams, 17 Cal 4th at 158.

67

[d.

66

[d. at 158-65.
[d. at 159.
[d.
Williams, 17 Cal. 4th at 159.
[d. at 160.
[d. at 161.

69
70
71
72
73
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Additionally, a court that decides a defendant is not within
the spirit of the Three Strikes Law must record its reasons for
such a finding. 74
Applying this standard to Williams, the Court found
nothing encouraging in his ''background, character and
prospects."75 The Court emphasized that Williams had four
convictions for driving under the influence and had been
consistently involved in other criminal activity.76 Additionally,
his convictions between age twenty and thirty-two involved not
only driving under the influence and being a felon in possession
of a firearm, but also a misdemeanor charge of spousal
battery.77 The Court concluded, "[i]n view of the foregoing, the
superior court's order fell outside the bounds of reason under
the applicable law and the relevant facts."78

3. The Implications of Williams and Romero
Williams instructed California judges that while Romero
discretion exists, it is not limitless. By addressing amorphous
concepts such as "in the furtherance of justice," the California
Supreme Court seemingly hoped to reign in judges from
limitlessly exercising sentencing discretion.
Williams's
criminal history was, however, arguably excessive as it
included violent crimes and crimes involving firearms. Also,
the "wobbler" that was charged as a felony, driving while
intoxicated, is one which society has a great interest in
deterring. 79 Therefore, questions still remained after Williams.
For example, is a court acting in a legislative capacity
when it attempts to distinguish between those defendants who
fall within the spirit of Three Strikes and those that are
deserving of another chance? And how will judges defme the
"spirit" of Three Strikes when they are confronted with
defendants who do not clearly fit within either of those
categories? One of the great concerns that remained after
74

[d ..

7S

[d. at 163.

Williams, 17 Cal. 4th at 163.
[d.
78 [d. at 164.
79 [d. at 153. Although Williams was arrested before an accident occurred, he was
so incapacitated by phencyclidine (PCP) that the officer had to ask him for his license
eight times and each time Williams responded, "[b]ow are you doing sir?" [d ..
76
77
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Romero and Williams was whether judicial discretion would be
applied to avoid extremely long sentences that many believed
violated the defendants' constitutional rights.
B. EIGHTH AMENDMENT PROHIBITION OF DISPROPORTIONATE
SENTENCES AS A CHALLENGE TO "THREE STRIKES"

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides, "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted."so
The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment as a bar to
sentences that are disproportionate to a defendant's
conviction. 81
In Solem u. Helm, the defendant was convicted of passing a
bad $100 check. 82 He had previously been convicted six times
for nonviolent felonies. 83 None of Helm's previous convictions
were crimes against persons and intoxication was a
contributing factor in each offense. 84 The felonies included
obtaining money under false pretenses, third degree burglary,
and driving while intoxicated. 85
Although the typical
punishment for passing a bad check was five years in prison
and a $5,000 fine, Helm was sentenced under South Dakota's
recidivist statute to life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole. 86 To no avail, Helm argued to the South Dakota
Supreme Court that the sentence constituted cruel and
unusual punishment and thus violated his Eighth Amendment
rights. 87
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
consider Helm's Eighth Amendment claim. 88 The Supreme
Court found that the Eighth Amendment requires that a
defendant's sentence be proportionate to the crime

80

u.s. CONST. amend. VIII § 1.

87

Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
[d. at 281.
[d. at 279.
[d. at 280.
[d. at 279-80.
Solem, 463 U.S. at 281-83.
[d. at 283.

88

[d. at 284.

81
82

83
84
85
88
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committed. 89 The Court agreed that a certain amount of
deference must be shown to a state legislature's decisions
regarding punishment, but such deference does not concede
that any "penalty is per se constitutional."90 The Court
concluded "[i]n sum, a court's proportionality analysis under
the Eighth Amendment should be guided by objective criteria,
including (i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the
penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the
same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for
commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions."91
In Helm's case, the Supreme Court identified his conviction
as "one of the most passive felonies a person could commit."92
While the Supreme Court recognized that Helm was punished
more severely because of his recidivist status, it also demanded
that such a status be carefully analyzed. 93
The Court
emphasized that none of Helm's past offenses involved violence
against people. 94 The Supreme Court concluded that Helm
received a harsher sentence for his nonviolent crime than most
offenders receive for violent crimes against persons, such as
rape. 95 The Court also emphasized that Helm received a
tougher sentence under South Dakota's recidivist statute than
he would have received in any other state, with one possible
exception. 96
The Supreme Court concluded that Helm's
"sentence is significantly disproportionate to his crime and is
therefore, prohibited by the Eighth Amendment."97
Members of the Supreme Court slightly revised the Solem
analysis in Harmelin v. Michigan. 98
In Harmelin, the
defendant was convicted of cocaine possession and sentenced to
life without the possibility of parole. 99 The Supreme Court
granted review of Harmelin's claims. 10o The Supreme Court
affirmed his sentence, but the Justices disagreed about how the
89
90

91
92
93
94
96
96

97

98
99
100

[d.
ld. at 290.
Solem, 463 U.S. at 292.
[d. at 296 (quoting State v. Helm, 287 N.W. 2d 497, 501 (S.D. 1980».
Solem, 463 U.S. at 297-97.
[d. at 297.
ld. at 298.
[d. at 299-300.
[d. at 303.
501 U.S. 957 (1991).
[d. at 961.
ld.
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Court should apply the Eighth Amendment proportionality
analysis. 101 Seven Justices held that the Eighth Amendment
requires that a defendant's sentence be proportionate to the
crime. 102 Justice White's opinion, joined by three other
Justices, argued that the Court should continue to apply the
Solem analysis. 103 Justices Kennedy, O'Connor and Souter
opined that the court should adopt a modified test where the
second and third objective Solem factors would only be reached
in cases where an initial comparison of the punishment and the
crime leads one to believe that the sentence is indeed grossly
disproportionate. 104 Since Harmelin, courts have variously
employed the Solem analysis as \\Tell as Justice Kennedy's
modified Solem test.105
The proportionality analysis has been applied to habitual
offender. statutes, such as California's Three Strikes Law.106
Recidivist statutes are not necessarily unconstitutional solely
because they provide an increased punishment for certain
crimes.107 It is possible, however, to prove a constitutional
violation on a case-by-case basis by showing that the sentence
is disproportionate to the present offense, or that the previous
offenses are nonviolent. lOS
The Ninth Circuit agrees that "the Eighth Amendment
prohibits punishments that are soundly rejected by the
"'evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society.''' 109
Thus, "a criminal sentence is
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment if it is 'extreme
and grossly disproportionate'" to the crime committed. no
Opponents of Three Strikes argued that the law clearly
violated the Eighth Amendment proportionality requirement.
Still, convictions under Three Strikes and the length of
defendants' sentences continued to increase. California courts
continued to uphold exceedingly long sentences for lesser
[d. at 996.
21A AM. JUR. 2d Criminal Law § 954 (1998).
103 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1009·1027 .
104 [d. at 996·1009
105 21A AM. JUR. 2d Criminal Law § 954 (1998).
106 39 AM. JUR. 2d Habitual Criminals and Subsequent Offenders § 14 (1998).
107 [d.
108 [d.
109 Belgrade v. State of Mont., 123 F.3d 1210, 1215 (9th Cir. 1997) quoting Harris v.
Wright, 93 F.3d 581, 583 (9th Cir.1996).
110 [d.
101

102
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crimes using the "spirit" of Three Strikes and the punishment
of recidivism as justification.
II. How CALIFORNIA COURTS HAVE INTERPRETED THREE
STRIKES SINCE ROMERO AND SOLEM

Mter Romero and Williams were decided, California courts
continued to struggle with the notion of judicial discretion and
the constitutionality of the Three Strikes Law. In 1995, Kevin
Weber, a homeless alcoholic, was sentenced under California's
Three Strikes Law to 25 years to life for stealing four cookies
from a restaurant.l11 He appealed the sentence on the ground
that it constituted cruel and unusual punishment.1l2 By the
time Weber's case was on appeal, the California Supreme Court
decided in Romero that judges have a certain amount of
discretion to strike a previous felony conviction in order to
avoid an overly harsh sentence and thereby avoid any Eighth
Amendment claim.
In Weber's case, however, the California Court of Appeal
declined to use its Romero discretion and affirmed the trial
court's sentence.1l3 The court emphasized Weber's criminal
history including previous convictions for burglary, assault
with a firearm and receiving stolen goods. 1l4 Yet the court
seemed to unfairly use his recidivist status to justify a harsh
sentence and to prophesize that the gravity of the harm of
Weber's current offense would have been worse had Weber not
been apprehended. In a unanimous decision, Justice Sills
wrote, "[a] safecracker who cracks an empty safe is nonetheless
a safecracker."115 The court believed that Weber would have
stolen more than four cookies had the restaurant's alarm not
sounded.1l6
In another case, the Court of Appeal reversed a lower
court's decision to strike Ralph Aguilar Carrion's previous
felony and sentence him to eight years rather than the
111 Stuart Pfeifer & Jack Leonard, Court Upholds 3-Strikes Term for Cookie Thief
Ruling, L.A. TIMES, June 19, 2001, at B7.
112 [d.
113 [d.
114 [d.
115

[d.

Stuart Pfeifer & Jack Leonard, CQurt Upholds 3-Strikes Term for Cookie Thief
Ruling, L.A. TIMES, June 19, 2001, at B7.
116
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mandatory twenty-five to life that he would have received
under the Three Strikes Law. ll7 The Court opined that the
trial court had abused its discretion and did not give
"appropriate weight to Carrion's record of recidivism."118
Carrion's prior convictions included second-degree burglary as
a teenager, burglary as an adult in 1989, and possession of
fifteen dollars worth of heroin in 1998. 119
The trial court found that Carrion's problem was severe
drug addiction and described his third offense as nonviolent. 12o
Thus, the court decided that a life sentence was too extreme in
this case. 121 The Court of Appeal, however, overruled the trial
court decision, reasoning that "Carrion is clearly within the
spirit of the three-strikes law ... there is no evidence that he
will modify his conduct in the future."122
Recently the Court of Appeal again upheld the trial court's
refusal to use its discretion to prevent a defendant from facing
a life sentence for petty theft.123 In People v. Murphy, the
defendant was found guilty of petty theft with three prior
convictions for first-degree burglary. 124
The trial court
sentenced Murphy to prison for twenty-five years to life.125
Murphy appealed and argued that his sentence constituted
cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment. 126 The appellate court remanded the case back to
the trial court to decide whether to exercise its judicial
discretion and strike a previous felony conviction. 127
On remand, Murphy argued that imposing a life sentence
for petty theft would constitute cruel and unusual punishment
and urged the court to exercise its Romero discretion. 128 The

[d.
[d.
119 [d.
120 [d.
121 Stuart Pfeifer & Jack Leonard, Court Upholds 3·Strikes Term for Cookie Thief
Ruling, L.A. TIMES, June 19, 2001, at B7.
122 [d. Emphasis added.
123 People v. Murphy, 88 Cal. App. 4th 392 (2001).
124 [d. at 393.
125 [d.
126 [d. at 393·94.
127 [d. at 394 ..
128 Murphy, 88 Cal. App. 4th at 394.
117

118
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court refused to recognize either of his arguments. 129 Murphy
appealed again. 130
The Court of Appeal addressed three issues: (1) whether
the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to erase one of
Murphy's previous strikes, (2) whether Murphy's sentence
constituted cruel and unusual punishment, and (3) whether
Murphy was precluded from challenging his sentence in any
respect other than his original argument due to the nature of
the appellate court's limited remand.l31 The court held that, as
it had previously affirmed the sentence and only remanded to
allow the trial court to determine whether or not it wanted to
exercise Romero discretion, Murphy was precluded from
arguing that the elevation of petty theft to a felony to invoke
the Three Strikes Law violated constitutional due process and
double jeopardy principles. 132 In addition, the Murphy court
concluded that, "the [trial] court did not abuse its discretion
under Romero by refusing to vacate the strike findings, and
that Murphy's sentence is not cruel or unusual." 133
Unfortunately, due to the nature of the limited remand, the
court did not offer any justification for its belief that Murphy's
sentence complied with the Eighth Amendment.
In another case involving Romero discretion, Bradford
Strong was charged with selling $10 worth of a substance that
he led an undercover officer to believe was cocaine. 134 Tests
later revealed that the rock-like substance did not contain any
illicit narcotics. 135 At the preliminary hearing the district
attorney moved to amend the complaint and add a strike.1 36 In
1996, Strong had been convicted of assault with a deadly
I

Id.
Id.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 396.
133 Murphy, 88 Cal. App. 4th at 394.
(The Court did not discuss either of these
issues and instead analyzed why Murphy was prohibited from raising new arguments
on appeal regarding his sentence, as the appellate court had not reversed it. Therefore,
it is impossibie to evaluate why the court did not believe that the trial court abused its
discretion or that 25 years to life in prison does not constitute cruel or unusual
punishment.)
134 People v. Strong, 87 Cal App 4th 328, 332 (2001).
135 Id.
136 Id.
129

130
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weapon causing great bodily injury.137 The trial court denied
the motion to amend as "unreasonable."138
Instead, the judge informed Strong that "if he wished to
plead guilty to the current offense and admit the prior
conviction, the court would sentence him to the lower term of
the offense and dismiss the strike."139 The district attorney
argued that Strong had a long criminal history and attempted
to convince the court that Strong's current offense posed a
threat of violence because, "(p]eople get assaulted, stabbed, and
even killed for selling bunk when prospective buyers discover
they have been cheated."140
The trial court judge rejected the district attorney's
argument, dismissed Strong's strike, denied him parole
because of his long record and current narcotics charge and
sentenced him to 16 months in prison. 141 The judge explained
that the strike should be dismissed for numerous reasons.
First, the current offense was "relatively non-threatening"
because Strong was not actually selling a narcotic substance. 142
Also, Strong had statistically become a reduced risk to society
because of his middle age. 143 In addition, Strong's record, was
"devoid of violence or threat of violence except for the strike,
which did not involve a firearm" and had no prior conviction for
use or possession of a firearm. 144 Finally, Strong's record only
amounted to a number of "petty acquisitive offenses and
substance abuse [and sentencing him under the three strikes
law] . . . would be inconsistent with the spirit of the Three
Strikes law as explicated by People v. Williams."145
The Court of Appeal, however, found that none of the trial
court's reasons for vacating Strong's prior strike reasonably
constituted extraordinary circumstances that would remove
him from within the spirit of the Three Strikes Law. 146 In
doing so, the Court of Appeal declared that, "[a]lthough the
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146

[d.
[d.

Strong, 87 Cal App 4th at 333.
[d. at 334.
[d.
[d.
[d.
Strong, 87 Cal. App. 4th at 334.
[d.
[d. at 331-32.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2002

19

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 3

188

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:2

trial court reasoned that defendant's violent strike was 'out of
character,' a defendant who falls squarely within the law's
letter does not take himself outside its spirit by the additional
commission of a virtually uninterrupted series of nonviolent
felonies and misdemeanors over a lengthy period."147
The appellate court reasoned that one discerns the spirit of
the Three Strikes Law by analyzing the statutory intent. 148
The court explained that "the Three Strikes Law expressly
declares that its purpose is 'to ensure longer prison sentences
and greater punishment for those who commit a felony and
have been previously convicted of serious and/or violent
offenses.' "149
The court's interpretation, however, is founded on
California cases where the spirit of Three Strikes was applied
to the "revolving door defendant."15o Absent is a discussion of
the law's goal of preventing certain violent or serious felonies.
Instead the court claimed that a mere history of multiple
offenses, whether violent or not, validates the application of the
Three Strikes Law. 151
This line of post-Romero cases indicates that while Romero
is still considered good law in California, the discretion it
affords to the judiciary is viewed in the narrowest light. 152 The
holdings represent how limited judicial discretion remains in
Three Strikes cases. 153 California courts do not seem to view
life sentences as extreme for minor offenses, such as petty
theft, when those offenses are combined with a long criminal
history regardless of whether this history is based on poverty
or drug addiction.

[d. at 331.
[d. at 336-37.
149 Strong, 87 Cal. App. 4th at 337. (citing § 667, subdivision (b); Ballot Pamphlet,
text of Proposition 184, General Election at 64 (Nov. 8, 1994).
150 Strong, 87 Cal. App. 4th at 338.
161 [d.
162 See Strong, 87 Cal. App. 4th at 338; Murphy, 88 Cal. App. 4th at 394.
163 The"Three Strikes and You're Out" Law: An Update, Legislative Analyst's Office,
1997. According to a 1997 study conducted by the Legislative Analyst's Office, there
was little change in the numbers of second and third strike offenders imprisoned
between 1995 and 1997, the year before and after Romero, respectively.
147

148
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III.

WHY THE THREE STRIKES LAw IN CALIFORNIA VIOLATES
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES AND IS AN INADEQUATE VIOLENT
CRIME PREVENTATIVE

A.

THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT HINTS AT THE
CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS OF THREE STRIKES

In 1999, the United States Supreme Court voiced concerns
over the application of the "third strike" in California Three
Strikes cases. In Riggs v. California, a homeless man stole a
bottle of vitamins from a supermarket. 154 Although the
California Court of Appeal described the offense as "a petty
theft motivated by homelessness and hunger," it held that the
Three Strikes Law authorized the court to treat the offense as
a felony and sentence Riggs to a minimum of twenty-five years
to life imprisonment. 155 Even though the United States
Supreme Court denied certiorari to Riggs' Eighth Amendment
claim that his sentence was grossly disproportionate to his
crime, Justice Stevens wrote "[t]his question is obviously
substantial, particularly since California appears to be the only
state in which a misdemeanor could receive such a severe
sentence."156
Further, "while this court has traditionally accorded to
state legislatures considerable (but not unlimited) deference to
determine the length of sentences 'for crimes concededly
classified and classifiable as felonies,'petty theft does not
appear to fall into that category."157 Justice Stevens does
admit that a recidivist statute, which punishes a defendant
more heavily for his or her recidivism, is justified, but
distinguishes this from a statute that in effect includes
additional punishment for earlier crimes. 15S The United States
Supreme Court declined to grant certiorari because, "neither
the California Supreme Court nor any federal tribunal has yet
addressed the question."159

525 u.s. 1114 (1999).
[d.
156 [d.
167 Riggs, 525 u.S. at 1114, citing Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 (1980).
158 Riggs, 525 U.S. at 1114.
169 [d. (Justice Stevens's opinion denying certiorari was joined by Justices Souter
and Ginsburg.)
154

156
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Justice Breyer's dissent on the other hand, believed the
issue of applying the Three Strikes Law to a petty offense
raised serious questions and thus argued the issue was ripe. l60
Therefore, while Riggs is clearly not precedent, at the very
least it is an indication that the United States Supreme Court
seriously questions the constitutionality of California's Three
Strikes Law.
In 2001, the United States Supreme Court again grappled
with the Three Strikes Law. 161 In Durden v. California, the
defendant appealed his sentence to the state court of appeal
and was denied review. 162 The United States Supreme Court
also denied certiorari.1 63 In this case, however, both Justices
Souter and Breyer would have granted certiorari. 164 Justice
Souter explained that while in Riggs he had wished to wait and
see the outcome of state decisions on the issue, he believed that
this reason no longer justified denying certiorari. 165 He
expressed concern that, "two years after Riggs, the Supreme
Court of California has not taken up the issue."166 More
importantly, "some 319 California prisoners are now serving
sentences of twenty-five years to life for what would otherwise
be misdemeanor theft under the California scheme."167 Justice
Souter concluded that, "[o]n these facts, I would wait no
longer. The issue is serious, the state courts have had
adequate opportunity to consider it, and the stakes are
substantial."168 Therefore, though continuing to deny certiorari
to review Eighth Amendment claims, some members of the
United States Supreme Court have clearly expressed concern
about the application of Three Strikes in California.
While some argue that the "Three Strikes [Law] is a much
more defensible law after Romero's construction,"169 it is
nevertheless difficult to see why in light of the cases that
160

161
162

163

164
165

Riggs, 525 U.S. at 1114.
Durden v. California, 531 U.S. 1184 (2001).
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.

167

Durden, 531 U.S. 1184.
[d.

168

[d.

166

Brian P. Janiskee & Edward J. Erler, Crime, Punishment, and Romero: An
Analysis of the Case Against California's Three Strikes Law 39 DUQ. L. REV. 43, 65
(2000).
169
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followed. If judges are refusing to employ their discretion, even
in the most extreme cases like Weber's, while others are being
overturned for abuse of discretion, it is not clear that Romero
discretion truly exists. Romero remains an elusive power
seldom exercised and the "spirit" of Three Strikes remains an
expansive justification for longer prison terms given to
nonviolent offenders.
B. THREE STRIKES LAw: AN INEFFECTIVE DETERRENT
In 1997, the Department of Justice conducted a study
comparing California's Three Strikes Law to the State of
Washington's recidivist statute. The study indicated that while
the majority of offenders in California were sentenced under
the Three Strikes Law for nonviolent crimes, in Washington,
all but o~ person was sentenced under its recidivist statute for
crimes against persons. 170
Another study of the Three Strikes Law published by the
Stanford Law and Policy Review indicates that the California
law as written is ineffective and overbroad. l7l
Although
proponents of recidivist statutes claim that the institution of
harsher sentencing has resulted in lowering crime rates, there
has been a steady decline in crime for the past decade including
the years before the Three Strikes Law was enacted. 172
Additionally, in comparing states with recidivist statutes and
those without any Three Strikes legislation there is no
discernable difference between the declining crime rates. 173
The Stanford study also argues that since Three Strikes is
partially justified as a deterrent, it would be proven successful
only if crime rates were dropping in groups targeted by the
Three Strikes Law. 174 For example, Three Strikes was enacted
to deter career criminals from committing any further criminal
activity. 175 The age group most likely targeted by such a
statute would be those over thirty as an older offender is more
170

Jeremy Travis, Three Strikes and You're Out: A Review of State Legislation,

NAT'L INST. OF JUST., 3 (1997)
171 Mike Males & Dan Macallair, Striking Out: The Failure of California's "Three
Strikes" and You're Out Law, 11 STAN. L. & POL'y REV. 65 (2000).
172 Id. at 65, 66.
173 [d. at 65.
174 [d.
175 [d.
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likely to have previous felony offenses. 176 Indeed "California
crime statistics reveal that felony offenders in their 30s and
40s are eight and ten times, respectively, more likely to be
sentenced under Three Strikes than felons in their early
20S."177 Therefore, if Three Strikes Law is an effective
deterrent, one would expect to see the greatest decline in crime
in the above thirty age group. 178 However, "in the categories of
violent and property index offenses, offenders over age 30
accounted for almost 84 percent of California's arrest growth
over the last two decades."179 Thus, it seems that Three Strikes
is not effectively deterring those over age thirty from
committing crimes.
The Stanford study further argues that the Three Strikes
Law is applied differently in the various counties of
California. ISO Arguably, the counties that apply the Three
Strikes Law more leniently should see the lowest dQcrease in
felony crimes. On the contrary, "San Francisco County, which
had the lowest rate of Three Strikes commitments, experienced
a 35 percent decline in homicides, a 33 percent decline in all
violent crimes, and a 28 percent decline in all index crimes."181
In comparison, counties that used the legislation more
extensively did not see such a dramatic drop in crime rates. 182
Finally, the study indicates that an analysis of what
felonies constitute offenders' third and fmal strike show that
only three percent involve murder and only thirty-six percent
involve other types of violent offenses. 183 As a result the vast
majority of third strikes are given for nonviolent offenses, such
as property crimes and drug offenses and "[m]any of the Third
Strikes appear to be misdemeanors, which, under probation
guidelines, are bumped up to felonies."184
These studies indicate that California's Three Strikes Law
is ineffective. Three Strikes is unsuccessful because there is no
176 Mike Males & Dan Macallair, Striking Out: The Failure of California's "Three
Strikes"and You're Out Law, 11 STAN. L. & POL'VREV. 65 (2000).
177 [d.
178 [d.
179 [d.
180 [d. at 65, 67.
181 Mike Males & Dan Macallair, Striking Out: The Failure of California's ''Three
Strikes" and You're Out Law, 11 STAN. L. & POL'V REV. 65, 68 (2000).
182 [d.
183 [d.
184

[d.
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proof that the law is a deterrent. Further, statistics show that
the Three Strikes Law is not targeting dangerous and violent
career criminals as it was created to do. Instead, non-violent
offenders have been incarcerated at alarming rates. lS5

IV.

RECONCILING THE SPIRIT OF THE THREE STRIKES LAw WITH
THE SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION

A. A NEW INTERPRETATION BRINGS NEW HOPE

On November 2, 2001, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
held for the first time that sentencing a defendant under Three
Strikes to twenty-five years to life, where the triggering offense
is a misdemeanor petty theft, may violate the Eighth
Amendment to the constitution. ls6 While the court refused to
hold that Three Strikes is generally unconstitutional, it did
find that the law violated Leandro Andrade's rights because his
sentence was grossly disproportionate to his crime. l87
The Ninth Circuit, referring to the pre-sentencing report,
explained that Andrade is a long-time drug addict who has
been convicted of five felonies and two misdemeanors, all of
which were nonviolent. lss In November of 1995, Andrade was
arrested twice for shoplifting videos from Kmart, which totaled
$153.94 in value. lS9
Both of these offenses were clearly
nonviolent and constituted a petty theft, which is generally
charged as a misdemeanor.l9o Since Andrade had a previous
theft-related conviction, the current petty thefts were counted
as "wobblers."l9l A wobbler, such as petty theft with a prior
1811 See Legislative Analyst's Office Study, The "Three Strikes and You're Out" Law:
An Update, 1997. According to a 1997 study conducted by the Legislative Analyst's
Office, less than one quarter of second strike offenders were imprisoned for a violent or
serious offense. In fact, the most common offenses designated as second strikes were
possession of a controlled substance, petty theft with a prior petty theft conviction and
second·degree burglary.
188 Andrade v. Att'y Gen. of California, 270 F.3d 743 (9th Cir. 2001).
187 Id. at 747.
188 Id. at 748. (Andrade's convictions include: a misdemeanor theft in 1982; a plea of
guilty to a consolidated preceding of three counts of residential burglary in 1983;
transportation of marijuana in 1988; petty theft in 1990 and later the same year
transportation of marijuana; and parole violation for escape from federal prison in
1991.)
189 Id. at 749.
100 Id.
191 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 749.
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petty theft, may be charged as a misdemeanor or a felony
under the prosecutor's discretion. 192 The prosecutor in this
case chose to count the two petty thefts with a prior as
felonies. 193 Andrade's burglary convictions constituted his first
two strikes and the current petty thefts with a prior counted as
his third and fourth strike. 194 Andrade was found guilty on all
counts and sentenced to twenty-five years to life for each
current petty theft.195 The Ninth Circuit calculated that under
the Three Strikes Law, Andrade would be required to serve the
two twenty-five year sentences consecutively and thus, he
would not be eligible for parole until 2046 when he reached the
age of eighty-seven years old. 196
Andrade appealed his case through the state system to the
California Supreme Court, which denied his petition for
review. 197 Thereafter, Andrade filed a writ of habeas corpus in
a federal district court claiming constitutional violations,
including an argument that the sentence violated his Eighth
Amendment rights, which the district court quickly
dismissed. 198 The Ninth Circuit, however, granted a hearing
regarding the Eighth Amendment claim. 199
In its analysis of Andrade's claim, the court recounted the
case law surrounding disproportionate sentencing. 2°O
In
conclusion of its review of the Solem-Harmelin line of cases, the
court applied the revised three-factor test of Harmelin to
Andrade. 201 Here, the court found that an initial comparison of
Andrade's crime and sentence led to an "inference of gross
disproportionality."202
Considering Andrade's age, life
expectancy and the fact that Three Strikes requires sentences
to run consecutively and does not give good time credit, the
court found that his sentence was functionally equivalent to life
without the possibility of parole, which is the second harshest

192
193
194
196
196
197
198
199
200
201
202

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
Andrade, 270 F.3d at 750.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 753-58.
Andrade, 270 F.3d at 758.
[d.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol32/iss2/3

26

Gross: "Spirit" Of The Three Strikes Law

2002]

"SPIRIT" OF THE THREE STRIKES LA W

195

sentence only after capital punishment.203 This extreme
punishment was compared to his conviction of petty theft,
which the court found did not cause grave harm to society and
was generally charged as a misdemeanor.204 Finding that his
sentence was grossly disproportionate to his crime and was not
dissipated by his prior criminal record, which included only
nonviolent crimes, the court went on to examine the other
objective factors first set out in Solem. 205
First, the court performed an intrajurisdictional
comparison of Andrade's sentence to other defendants'
sentences in the same jurisdiction. 206 Andrade's sentence of
fifty years to life is generally exceeded only by a sentence for
first-degree. murder and a few other violent crimes such as
train wrecking.207 The court explained that even crimes of
extreme violence like second-degree murder, rape and sexual
assault on a minor are given much shorter sentences. 208
Additionally, the court calculated that petty theft without
a prior record would justify a sentence of up to six months in
county jail and up to a $1000 fine. 209 Petty theft with one prior
theft offense could receive up to three years in prison and thus,
Andrade could have received a maximum of 6 years for his two
current offenses. 21o
Although the State argued that Andrade's sentence must
only be compared to other recidivists with prior felony offenses,
the court explained that such an analysis would beg the
question of whether these sentences are unconstitutional. 211
Even if the court were convinced that such an analysis was
proper, it found Andrade's sentence was twice as long as any
non-violent recidivist punished under the Three Strikes Law. 212
The court concluded that the intrajurisdictional comparison
established that Andrade's sentence was significantly longer
than the sentences for most violent crimes and greatly
203

204
205
206
207
208
209

210
211
212

ld. at 758·59.
ld. at 759·60.
ld. at 750, 760-6l.
Andrade, 270 F.3d at 761·62.
ld.
ld.
ld. at 76l.
ld.
Andrade, 270 F.3d at 762.
ld.
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exceeded the sentences of nonviolent recidivists sentenced
under Three Strikes in California. 213
Next the court performed an interjurisdictional comparison
between California's Three Strikes Law and recidivist statutes
in Rhode Island, West Virginia, Texas and Louisiana. 214 The
court chose these states because they were the only four places
where petty theft with a prior could be a triggering offense for
sentencing under a recidivist statute. 215 The court found that
"[e]ven in these four states, however, Andrade could not receive
a sentence nearly as severe as he did under California's Three
Strikes law on the basis of his two prior strikes for residential
burglary."216
Based on this three-part objective factor test, the Ninth
Circuit decided to "disagree with the California Court of Appeal
and conclude that Andrade's sentence is so grossly
disproportionate to his crime that it violates the Eighth
Amendment to the Constitution."217
While this is the first time that any court has held
California's Three Strikes Law violated the Constitution, it is
important to remember how narrowly the Ninth Circuit drafted
this decision. The Three Strikes Law is in no way overturned
and this opinion may only give hope to a small number of those
sentenced under the law. Had Andrade's sentence been one life
sentence it is possible that the Ninth Circuit would have
upheld it since his sentence would then be closer to other
defendants and thus, the result of the intrajurisdictional
analysis would have been different. Still, the holding may
remind California courts of the seemingly forgotten Romero
discretion.
Perhaps such careful analysis that balances the "spirit" of
Three Strikes and the Eighth Amendment requirements of
Solem and Harmelin will lead California courts to achieve a
greater degree of fairness in sentencing. Perhaps this level of
fairness will remind the public and the legislature that the
spirit of the Constitution must be protected even in the wake of
unthinkable tragedy.
[d.
[d. at 762-67.
215 [d. at 762.
216 Andrade. 270 F.3d at 765.
m [d. at 765-66.
213

214
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B.

THE NINTH CIRCUIT REVERSES Two MORE THREE STRIKES
SENTENCES

In Brown v. Mayle, a decision handed down by the Ninth
Circuit on February 7, 2002, two more sentences required by
the Three Strikes Law were reversed as violations of the
defendants' Eighth Amendment rights. 218 The two defendants,
Earnest Bray, Jr. and Richard Napolean Brown, had both been
convicted of petty thefts with a prior, had previous felony
convictions, were given third strikes and were ultimately
sentenced to twenty-five years to life. 219 Bray's final offense
was attempting to steal three videotapes and Brown's
triggering offense was attempted theft of a $25 steering wheel
alarm from a drugstore. 220 The two defendants filed habeas
corpus petitions and were denied. 221 Both filed appeals arguing
that their sentences constituted cruel and unusual
punishment. 222
Mter the Andrade decision, the Ninth Circuit consolidated
Bray's and Brown's cases, appointed counsel, as they had
previously filed pro se motions, and required the parties to
submit briefing on whether Andrade would affect either
defendant. 223
Citing its own previous opmIOn, the Ninth Circuit
proceeded to apply the same in depth analysis employed in
Andrade to the question of whether these defendants'
sentences were constitutional. 224 The Andrade analysis led the
Ninth Circuit to conclude that Bray's and Brown's cases were
very similar to Andrade's as all three defendants were
convicted of shoplifting small amounts of inexpensive
merchandise and had received indeterminate life sentences. 225
There were, however, several differences between the cases
that the Ninth Circuit addressed within its constitutionality
analysis. For example, Bray and Brown had each received one
twenty-five to life sentence while Andrade had received two
218
219

220
221
222

223

:m
2211

Brown v. Mayle, 2002 WL 187415 (9th eir. Feb. 7,2002).
[d. at *1.
[d. at *2 -*3.
[d. at *3.
[d. at *4.
Brown, 2002 WL 187415, at *4.
[d. at *4 -*18.
[d. at *7 -*8.
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such sentences. 226 Although the State argued that this
dissimilarity resulted in a very different analysis of the gross
dis proportionality of the sentences to the offenses, the Court
disagreed. 227 The Ninth Circuit explained, "[I]f Andrade's 50year-to-life sentence for two petty theft convictions was grossly
disproportionate, it follows that a 25-year-to-life sentence is
grossly disproportionate to one petty theft conviction."228
The Ninth Circuit further explained that the length of
Bray's or Brown's sentence did not alter the intrajurisdictional
analysis of Andrade. 229 The State argued, as it did in Andrade,
that since about one hundred other defendants received
indeterminate life sentences for petty thefts with priors under
Three Strikes, the interjurisdictional analysis leans in favor of
upholding Bray's and Brown's sentences. 230
The court,
however, explained that Andrade held that it is impossible to
argue a statute is constitutional by showing evidence of other
similar applications of the statute. 231 The Ninth Circuit
graphically analogized that, "[i]f, for example, the state
decided to chop off the hands of everyone convicted of speeding,
the likely conclusion that such a sentence is cruel and unusual
would not change because the state inflicted it on many
people."232
In performing the interjurisdictional analysis, the court
found that the four states used as comparison in Andrade were
still the only four places where petty theft with a prior could
constitute a triggering offense for a recidivist statute
sentence. 233 The court concluded that neither defendant would
have received such a harsh sentence in Rhode Island, Texas or
West Virginia. 234 Additionally, the court commented that
Louisiana had recently amended its recidivist statute and that
neither defendant would have received twenty-five years to life
without the possibility of parole under current Louisiana law

226
227

228
229

230
231
232
233
234

[d. at *8.
[d.
Brown, 2002 WL 187415, at *8.
[d. at *9.
[d.
[d.
[d.
Brown, 2002 WL 187415, at *10.
[d.
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as they did in California. 235 The court emphasized that,
"[r]ecent rejection of a higher sentence by the only state that
perhaps would have allowed it in narrow circumstances signals
a considered national legislative judgment based on actual
experience that California's sentence is indeed disproportionate
to the crime."236
The final difference between Andrade, Bray and Brown,
which the court discussed, was the presence of previous violent
crimes in both Bray's and Brown's past. 237 Bray had three
previous robbery convictions. 238 Brown had been convicted of
five serious or violent offenses including two counts of seconddegree burglary, two counts of assault with a deadly weapon
and one count of robbery.239 Both defendants were convicted of
several other misdemeanor crimes as well. 240 The court
indicated that this difference does not dictate a different
outcome than the one in Andrade for several reasons.241
First, the court explained that the "violent" crimes that
Bray and Brown were convicted of were not considered violent
at the time of their convictions. 242 Second, the court held that
conviction of previous violent offenses is only significant when
the current offense is violent as well. 243 The court explained
that when an offender commits a violent crime, and it is
established that he has committed previous violent offenses,
his proclivity towards violence justifies sentencing him under a
severe recidivist statute. 244 The court stated that there is no
similar justification for punishing a nonviolent offender for
past violent offenses. 245 The Ninth Circuit concluded, "[a]fter
Andrade, for all the reasons already surveyed, an
indeterminate life sentence for a defendant convicted of felony
petty theft with a prior who has at least two prior serious

[d. at 12.
[d. at *13.
237 [d. at *13 -*16.
238 Brown. 2002 WL 187415. at *2.
239 [d. at *3.
240 [d. at *3 -*4.
241 [d. at *13.
242 [d. (All forms of robbery were not considered violent crimes until the amendment
of Cal. Penal Code 667.5(c)(9) in 2000). [d.
243 Brown. 2002 WL 187415. at *15.
244 [d.
245 [d. at *14.
230
236
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felony convictions . . . violates the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment."246
Once again, the court did not overturn Three Strikes and it
did not find every application of California's recidivist statute
unconstitutional. The Ninth Circuit did hold, however, that
the application of Three Strikes to defendants whose triggering
offense is petty theft and the resulting imposition of twentyfive years to life without the possibility of parole is cruel and
unusual punishment. 247 The California court was thus ordered
to resentence Bray and Brown in light of this decision. 248
C. PRoPOSALS TO AMEND CALIFORNIA'S THREE STRIKES LAw

1. Current Trends in the Movement to Revamp the Three
Strikes Law
On February 23, 2001, Assemblywoman Jackie Goldberg
introduced an act to amend California Penal Code Sections 667
and 1170.12.249 The Goldberg bill seeks to change several
aspects of the sentencing guidelines under the Three Strikes
Law. 250 Currently the length of time between the prior and
current felony conviction does not affect the sentence. The bill
seeks to change this.251 Additionally, it seeks to change the
prohibition on using diversion programs such as commitment
to the California Rehabilitation Center.252 The bill "would
delete the provisions providing that the length of time between
the prior felony conviction and the current felony conviction
shall not affect the imposition of the sentence."253 It would
"make these provisions inapplicable to cases where more than
10 years have elapsed since the maximum sentence or
sentences of the previous conviction."254 The bill would also
"permit commitment to a facility outside of the state and the

246
247
248
249

!ISO
251

252
253
254

Id. at *15.
[d. at *18.
Brown, 2002 WL 187415, at *18.
A.B. 1652,2001 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2001).
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
A.B. 1652 , 2001 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2001).
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granting of diversion or commitment to the California
Rehabilitation Center.255
Assemblywoman Goldberg made this reform effort a twoyear bill, which means that it will be held over until 2002's
legislative session as opposed to being voted on in 2001. 256 One
commentator argues that this means that Goldberg did not
think she would have enough votes to pass the bill this year. 257
The need for votes is severely felt within the Three Strikes
revision forum because, as a codified initiative, a two-thirds
majority is needed to make any modification to the existing
legislation. 258
Goldberg's bill takes several steps towards a more sensible
and fairer recidivist statute. By demanding that a defendant's
prior and current felony be within a limited time span, the
proposed bill eliminates the focus on individuals who do not
truly qualify as career criminals. In addition, by providing for
diversion programs, the bill limits the affect on those
defendants suffering from drug or alcohol addiction. Even these
changes, however, do not address the need to amend the Three
Strikes Law to avoid violations of the Eighth Amendment and
insure that the law is effectively targeting the crimes it was
enacted to prevent.

2. Legislative Proposals
In addition to the alterations proposed by Assemblywoman
Goldberg, there are several basic changes to the Three Strikes
Law that the legislature could make in order to limit the law's
scope to those crimes which society has the greatest interest in
preventing. 259 First, the legislature should revise the list of
felonies included within the "violent or serious" definitions.260
If the Three Strikes initiative was voted for and enacted to
quell Californians' concern over violent crimes against persons
then perhaps the statute should address this fear directly

Id.
See Alan Block, 'Three Strikes" Reform: A Small But Determined Group of
Activists Works to Change the Law, ORANGE COUNTY REG., July 29, 2001, at cover.
257 Id.
258 Luna, supra note 30 at 9.
259 See supra notes 170·185 and accompanying text.
260 See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
255

256
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without ensnaring lesser offenders under its overreaching list
of qualifying offenses.
Specifically, all offenses that are not crimes against
persons should be excluded from the list. For instance,
burglary should be excluded unless the homeowner is in the
house and is either threatened or assaulted by the offender in
order to commit the crime. This exclusion is extremely
important especially in California where the Penal Code
defines burglary as the entrance of any structure with the
intent to commit a felony therein. 261 Under this scheme, a
person who steals a bike from an attached garage can be
convicted of burglary and charged with a strike even if he
never entered the house and no actual violence against a
person was used in the commission of the crime.
Moreover, the selling of certain drugs to minors should not
be considered a strike in all cases. Under the current
incarnation, an eighteen-year-old who sells his seventeen-yearold friend heroin will receive a strike, but if the transaction
went in the opposite direction the Three Strikes Law would not
be implicated. 262
Therefore, the present system seems
unreasonably arbitrary.
The most important change, however, that the legislature
should make to conform the Three Strikes Law to the Eighth
Amendment pursuant to the Solem and Harmelin mandates is
to require that all three strikes be given for violent or serious
felonies only. Nonviolent felonies such as drug possession must
be expressly excluded from counting as a third strike.
Currently, any third felony, whether violent or serious will
result in an indeterminate life sentence. 263 Therefore, a third
See CAL. PEN. CODE § 459 (West 2001) providing:
[e]very person who enters any house, room, apartment, tenement, shop,
warehouse, store, mill, barn, stable, outhouse, or other building, tent, vessel as
defined in Section 21 of the Harbors and Navigation Code, floating home, as
defined in subdivision (d) of Section 18075.55 of the Health and Safety Code,
railroad car, locked or sealed cargo container, whether or not mounted on a
vehicle, trailer coach, as defined in Section 635 of the Vehicle Code, vehicle as
defined by the Vehicle Code, when the doors are locked, aircraft as defined by
Section 21012 of the Public Utilities Code, or mine or any underground portion
thereof, with intent to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony is guilty of
burglary. As used in this chapter, 'inhabited' means currently being used for
dwelling purposes, whether occupied or not.

281

[d.
262
263

See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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strike can be charged for theft, drug sales and even drug
possession. An individual, who has a criminal history and has
tallied up two strikes, will spend the next twenty-five years of
his life in prison even if his current offense is possession of
marijuana.
It is easy to see how without strong drug
rehabilitation programs, job training or employment
opportunities, California has turned its back on the notion of
rehabilitating individuals to re-enter society after committing
an offense.
Instead, as a community we have decided to allow the
Three Strikes Law and mass incarceration conceal societal
problems such as unemployment and drug abuse from our
sight. Unfortunately, this method does nothing to solve these
problems, and as stated previously, has not deterred them
either.264
Finally, the legislature should amend the Three Strikes
Law so that prosecutors are precluded from elevating a
misdemeanor such as petty theft to a felony for the purposes of
charging a strike as in order to sentence a defendant to an
indeterminate life sentence. 265 Instead of hoping that the
courts will be able to weigh each case individually and
determine when an offender falls within the spirit of Three
Strikes, the law should clearly indicate that its purpose is to
prevent any further commissions of violent or serious felonies.
By prohibiting prosecutors from charging individuals with a
third strike for crimes that are otherwise considered
misdemeanors the law would more efficiently target those
individuals who have spent time in prison for violent or serious
crimes and were not deterred from continuing such anti social
behavior.

3. Policy and Judicial Proposals
While legislative action is most desirable because it would
clearly indicate when strikes may be charged, such a strong
legislative action seems unlikely considering the number of
votes necessary to make a change. 266 Additionally, the current
political climate continues to thrive on a get tough on crime
264

265
266

See supra notes 170-185 and accompanying text.
See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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approach. 267 Therefore, considering current movements to
reform the Three Strikes Law and the recent Ninth Circuit
decisions, California courts should reconsider the power of
judicial discretion and the ability to strike prior felonies in
certain cases under section 1325(a).268
Although judicial discretion is understandably a power
that judges strive not to abuse, trial court judges should be
given greater latitude to determine whether a defendant falls
with the 'spirit' of the Three Strikes Law. The concern for a
degree of uniformity in sentencing, however, has driven many
to consider the restriction on judges' subjective decisionmaking. of the utmost importance.
Unfortunately, these
restrictions have been implemented at the cost of the humanity
of our criminal justice system. Mter all, we continue to invest
a great amount of respect in judges and choose those
individuals to act as the scales of justice.
While limitations on judicial discretion and sentencing
guidelines may seemingly result in identical sentencing for
criminal activity, these laws divest from judges their ability to
consider all the factors of an individual's background in order
to determine whether that individual indeed falls within the
spirit of the Three Strikes Law. Therefore, Andrade and Bray
should be read and applied broadly enough to include all
nonviolent offenders who have been sentenced to life in prison.
Judges should realize the power granted them through Section
1325(a), Romero, and Andrade, and use that power to limit the
unfair and unconstitutional effects of the California Three
Strikes Law.
CONCLUSION

The United States has become an extremely violent
society. The press bombards us with stories of tragedy and
death due to unfathomable acts by people against innocent
victims. It makes sense that as a society we have turned to the
law as an avenue to curb this violence and stem the tide of the
incomprehensible destruction of life that too often occurs. The
legal community, however, must attempt to understand the

267
268

See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 49·54, 187·248 and accompanying text.
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anger and strong emotions that we feel as a society and deal
with them rationally by creating legislation that results in a
decrease of violent crime and not merely legislation that leads
to mass incarceration of poverty-stricken and drug-addicted
individuals. There are other solutions to these greater societal
problems and we need to remember the oldest truism that the
punishment ought to fit the crime. 269

Rebecca Gross*

269 John Bartlet, Familiar Quotations, 7834 (10th ed. 1919), quoting Sir William
Schwenck, The Humane Mikado .
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